Unauthenticated settings update in woocommerce-ajax-filters

woocommerce-ajax-filters, which currently has over 10,000 installations (versions <=1.3.6) allows unauthenticated attackers to arbitrarily update all the plugin options and redirect any user to an external malicious URL when the product section is visited. The bug takes advantage of a misunderstanding of the admin_init hook’s execution context.

if( is_admin() ) {
      require_once dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/includes/wizard.php';
}
[...]

function wizard_selectors($wizard) {
[...]
 <div class="wizard_custom_js_css" style="display: none;">
    <h3><?php _e('User custom CSS style', 'BeRocket_AJAX_domain') ?></h3>
    <textarea name="berocket_aapf_wizard_settings[user_custom_css]">
        <?php echo br_get_value_from_array($option, array('user_custom_css')) ?>
    </textarea>
    <h3><?php _e('JavaScript Before Products Update', 'BeRocket_AJAX_domain') ?></h3>
    <textarea name="berocket_aapf_wizard_settings[user_func][before_update]">
        <?php echo br_get_value_from_array($option, array('user_func', 'before_update')) ?>
    </textarea>
    <h3><?php _e('JavaScript On Products Update', 'BeRocket_AJAX_domain') ?></h3>
    <textarea name="berocket_aapf_wizard_settings[user_func][on_update]">
        <?php echo br_get_value_from_array($option, array('user_func', 'on_update')) ?>
    </textarea>
    <h3><?php _e('JavaScript After Products Update', 'BeRocket_AJAX_domain') ?></h3>
    <textarea name="berocket_aapf_wizard_settings[user_func][after_update]">
        <?php echo br_get_value_from_array($option, array('user_func', 'after_update')) ?>
    </textarea>
</div>

[...]

What’s the problem with the code above?

• Developer assumed that WordPress’s admin_init hook are only called when an administrator user visited a page inside /wp-admin/
• The plugin settings allow users to add custom javascript code

A patch was released a few days ago to address this vulnerability.

Because of the nature of the bug, specifically it’s severity, we will not be disclosing additional details. We are seeing malicious requests being used in the wild. While most of them target /wp-admin/admin-post.php, other endpoints in the /wp-admin/ directory can be used to trigger the admin_init hook and exploit the vulnerability.

Malicious IPs attacking this plugin:

175.126.62.37
104.238.99.130
45.32.104.33
139.99.106.10
153.126.194.159
162.241.175.243
51.68.204.149
162.243.165.84
142.44.151.107
186.202.161.191
46.105.17.29
192.169.243.42
186.202.161.191
159.65.65.204
192.30.164.48
51.158.72.203
178.62.93.109
139.59.116.30
213.128.89.176
138.68.181.84

If you have an old version of this plugin installed please update to the latest version (1.3.7) asap. You can add a WAF as a second layer of protection and virtually patch the vulnerability.