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We are finding many sites infected with malicious redirects inside the .htaccess file, to secondtds.mooo[.]com/go.php?sid=3. That domain is a TDS (traffic controller) which redirects visitors to another website pushing your browser to download this malware: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/0b6eab15961f92da95a0a4b0d55fee8a8bd0eb39fec1027aa43575802d7a199e/analysis/1441223870/

The redirect chain is:
secondtds.mooo[.]com
downserver.ignorelist[.]com
pastdownload[.]com
stds1new.computersoftwarelive[.]com
download.pastdownload[.]com
files.september-master-3[.]xyz

Here is the .htaccess content:

The attack is quite buggy and doesn't check whether a site is already infected, thus multiple identical redirect rules in the same .htaccess file.

If you find this code, remove it right away!

GCCanada.com Malware

2015-09-01  by  Daniel Cid
We are seeing a large amount of sites with a malscript from gccanada.com injected into them. The malware redirects visitors to searchmagnified.com, which redirects them to freeresultsguide.com. That's the code being added to the hacked sites:

What is so bad about it? The final domain 'freeresultsguide.com', pushes you to buy a fake anti virus software with some annoying messages and warnings:

"Important security message. Please call the number provided asap to get your computer fixed. You have a virus!"



If you see this gcanada code on your site, it means you got hacked. It is not from the Government of Canada, as they want you to think.

Today we found a few websites that loaded strange code from tag-cloud-generator[.]com.

Sites tried load several image and font files from this site, but they all returned 404 Not Found. The only live file that they loaded was hxxp://www.tag-cloud-generator[.]com/js/fx2.js or it's pseudo-localized copies like hxxp://www.tag-cloud-generator[.]com/NL/js/fx2.js, hxxp://www.tag-cloud-generator[.]com/EN/js/fx2.js, hxxp://www.tag-cloud-generator[.]com/FR/js/fx2.js, etc.

The fx2.js files has an encrypted script that loads (randomly) one of the following scripts:

hxxp://www.tag-cLoud-generator[.]com/b01.js hxxp://www.tag-cLoud-generator[.]com/b02.js hxxp://www.tag-cLoud-generator[.]com/b03.js
hxxp://www.tag-cLoud-generator[.]com/b04.js

And those scripts in turn, redirect visitors to one of the following parked domains with ads:

www.rusoen[.]com
www.askinz[.]com
www.ad-u.com
www.kinkyfirehouse[.]com

using code like this

All these domains, including tag-cloud-generator[.]com are registered in China. If you ever used tag-cloud-generator, make sure to remove it from your site. We will share more information if we find anything new.

We found infected sites where malware created a fake WordPress plugin that generated pharma spam doorways.

Path: wp-content/plugins/social-share/wp-social-share.php

This file creates wp-content/plugins/social-share/share.php that calls itself WP Social Include File. It downloads doorway generator from hxxp://api-linux . net/json/json_01.txt, writes it into wp-content/mu-plugins/mu-plugin.png and then includes this file at the bottom of wp-includes/load.php

The doorway generator uses the following URLs:

Some of the above URLs should only be accessed using a special User Agent

If you are a hosting provider, we recommend blocking HTTP requests to these external sites, to stop the spam doorways from being distributed. We will share more details as we learn more about it.

The RevSlider SoakSoak malware campaign started with the soaksoak.ru domain (hence the name). However, since the last 2 weeks, it has mutated and used different domains as the initial malware intermediary.

This is the full list so far:

  1. soaksoak.ru: First one in the list. We identified more than 100,000 sites redirecting to it.
  2. 122.155.168.105: Started just after soaksoak, leveraging the /collect.js redirection. Almost 10,000 were blacklisted and compromised with it.
  3. ads.akeemdom.com
  4. wpcache-blogger.com: Second biggest campaign after soaksoak. More than 50,000 sites compromised and still going.
  5. theme.wpcache-blogger.com
  6. phoenix-credit.com: Current one active. Also leverages the /collect.js redirection and has compromised more than 11,000 different sites.


We will keep updating this list as the domains change and the attacks mutate.

We are seeing an increasing number of hacked sited with Chinese doorways promoting various fake merchandises (from Louis Vuitton handbags to NFL jerseys and Canada goose jackets).

Those doorways target both Western web searches and the Chinese. Here's how they make sure the doorway correctly preserves search queries in Chinese (converting from UTF-8 to gb2312) when they work with Google search referrer string:



Since Google uses "ie=ut-8" by default for most languages, queries using non-ASCII and non-Chinese Simplified characters will be garbled. Apparently the they are only interested in English and Chinese queries.

One of the common tactics used by spammers and black hat "SEO" is to use Doorway pages for their spam content. These pages get indexed by search engines and when visited by a real user (not a bot), redirect them to a different URL that they want to promote.

Most times, this is done using various automatic redirects. The redirect mechanism can be quite simple or very sophisticated, client-side (e.g. JavaScript) or server-side (PHP or/and .htaccess). What all of them have in common is they need to properly tell unneeded traffic from target traffic. To do it, the redirect scripts normally check a referrer, visitor's IP and User-Agent and then act accordingly.

However, these Chinese doorways for fake popular and luxury goods stores use a much simpler approach - they check visitors' time zone.

All the doorways include the same external JavaScript with the following code:



Which when deobfuscated looks like this:

This code checks if a visitor comes not from China (timezone is not GMT +8) and then redirects eligible visitors to the beneficiary (spam) site. Visitors from China and some neighboring countries (unneeded traffic) and bots without JavaScript stay on those gibberish keyword-staffed doorways pages.

We see many tricks that hackers use to make search engine bots think that the injected spam is not hidden. One of the common approaches is to place a spam block inside a "div" with some particular "id" or "class" and then add a JavaScript call to make that div invisible.

And the newest form of the "unlocked iphone" spam injection, tried something new (that also made us smile). It uses elementary school level math to make spammy a "div" id and the id in JavaScript to look different.

Here's the typical code:



The idea is simple: malware generates a random number (e.g. n) and then doubles that number and uses the result as the spam div id. And in the JavaScript code, they use the same multiplication operation verbatim as the getElementById(n*2) function parameter, which works because JavaScript implicitly converts numbers to strings.

The domain botsvsbrowsers.com is quite popular and used for comparing user agents (browsers) and seeing if a specific request is from a valid user or a bot.

And piggy backing on their popularity, the bad guys created a domain botsvsbrowsers.biz (.biz versus .com) to be used as a command and control server on spam SEO campaigns.

This is the code we are seeing on compromised sites:



Which basically contacts botsvsbrowsers.biz/Statistic/Stat.php on every page load, giving the client IP address, and URL and it decides what to inject to that user. Most of the time we are seeing just plain SPAM, but they are probably serving other malicious code as well.

So if you see any content being loaded from botsvsbrowsers.BIZ (or the IP address 46.165.222.93), you know it is malicious.

There are multiple ways to inject an iframe on a web site, and every day we found a new evasion technique to make it harder to detect it. This is a new one found by Fio:



It uses many encondings to just load this iframe:



Which redirects the user visitng a compromised site to a porn page.